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摘要：了解企业气候信息披露的复杂情况及其实际影响，对于管理与气候相关的金融风险至关重要。然而，目前的信息披露往往存在不精确、不准确和“漂绿”的问题。本文引入深度学习算法$ClimateBert_{CTI}$，以识别MSCI世界指数公司年度报告中与气候相关的空谈。研究发现只有有针对性的气候参与才会减少空谈。而自愿性气候披露则与更多的空谈相关。此外，空谈与负面新闻报道的增加和排放量的增长相关。因此，“空谈 ”有助于评估气候倡议的有效性，并预测声誉和转型风险。

引用：Bingler, J. A., Kraus, M., Leippold, M., & Webersinke, N. (2024). How cheap talk in climate disclosures relates to climate initiatives, corporate emissions, and reputation risk. Journal of Banking & Finance, 107191.

文献：PDF

Keywords: Corporate climate disclosures; Voluntary reporting; Commitments; Greenhouse gas emissions; Negative news coverage; Textual analysis.

Introduction

当前经济深刻转型时期，评估气候变化、气候政策和企业气候雄心声明对公司价值和投资组合策略的影响对投资者来说是一项重大挑战（例如，$\color{blue}{Deng\ et\ al.\ (2012SFIRP)}$）。财务利益相关者不仅必须了解公司的气候风险敞口，还必须了解其所传达的气候行动和承诺在缓解前瞻性转型和物理风险方面的有效性（$\color{blue}{Bingler\ and\ Colesanti\ Senni,\ 2022CP}$），这就需要进行前瞻性气候风险分析。随着金融市场向可持续做法转变，投资者和金融监管机构必须区分空谈和真实气候风险管理承诺和策略，使市场参与者能够准确评估前瞻性气候风险。

本文通过引入$ClimateBert{CTI}$解决这些问题，其为基于神经网络的$ClimateBert$模型构建的自然语言处理 （NLP）方法（$\color{blue}{Webersinke\ et\ al.,\ 2022arXiv}$）1。$ClimateBert$使研究人员和利益相关者能够辨别真实和非具体的气候承诺，并揭示公司披露的气候相关承诺的质量。这使得随后可以对企业的气候承诺及其与实际行动和结果的一致性进行大规模分析。具体而言，作者利用$ClimateBert{CTI}$开发一个“空谈指数”，量化公司气候承诺中肤浅的比例。该指数有助于系统分析空谈与自愿气候倡议、企业气候绩效以及媒体对环境事件的报道之间的关系。通过这项调查，旨在帮助人们更深入地了解企业沟通、利益相关者的看法和气候承诺的真正实施之间的动态，最终实现与气候相一致的商业实践，提高市场效率。

1. Our trained models are available at https://huggingface.co/climatebert. ↩

越来越多的文献强调气候相关信息（以新闻或公司披露的形式）对于积极管理气候相关金融风险和机遇的重要性2。 例如，$\color{blue}{Engle\ et\ al.\ (2020RFS)}$、$\color{blue}{Monasterolo\ and\ De\ Angelis\ (2020EcE)}$、$\color{blue}{Hsu\ et\ al.\ (2023JF)}$、$\color{blue}{Carbone\ et\ al.\ (2021SSRN)}$、$\color{blue}{Bolton\ et\ al.\ (2022JACF)}$的研究表明，金融市场已开始将企业与气候相关的转型风险和气候承诺纳入定价，并正在考虑气候对冲策略。然而，正如$\color{blue}{Hong\ et\ al.\ (2019JoE)}$、$\color{blue}{Baldauf\ et\ al.\ (2020RFS)}$、$\color{blue}{Bakkensen\ and\ Barrage\ (2004RFS)}$、$\color{blue}{Gostlow\ (2022SSRN)}$的研究表明，人们对市场效率低下的担忧持续存在，特别是在风险溢价中准确反映物理气候风险方面。一个主要挑战在于目前气候风险披露缺乏标准化和精确性，导致人们担心公司在气候相关报告中没有提供足够细致和对决策有用的信息3。 一般来说，公司可能有动机在气候信息披露中使用含糊的语言，以降低因潜在误导性信息而被起诉的风险。与此同时，他们面临着越来越大的压力，要求采取积极的气候行动，并透明地传达他们的承诺，以减少由于不作为或遗漏实质性相关信息而导致的诉讼风险，正如$\color{blue}{Weber\ and\ Hoesli\ (2020CL)}$和$\color{blue}{Hoesli\ (2021CL)}$所讨论的那样。

2:Diamond (1985) provides a positive theory of voluntary disclosure by firms. In the environmental context, see e.g., Clarkson et al., 2013, Plumlee et al., 2015, Grewal et al., 2019, Hong et al., 2019, Krueger et al., 2020, Kölbel et al., 2022, Demaria and Rigot, 2021, Bolton and Kacperczyk, 2021b, Carbone et al., 2021.
3: See, e.g., O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2020, Bolton et al., 2021, Griffin and Jaffe, 2021, Hoepner and Rogelj, 2021. In addition, previous research finds that companies report mainly positive information and that disclosures suffer from greenwashing and severe inaccuracies. See, e.g., Kim and Lyon, 2015, Marquis et al., 2016, Fabrizio and Kim, 2019, Bingler et al., 2022.

近年来，出现了许多行业主导或自愿的市场举措，以促进企业气候行动和决策有用的披露。其中，基于科学的目标倡议 (SBTi) 推动的气候行动、气候相关财务披露工作组 (TCFD) 的披露建议以及气候行动 100+ (CA100+) 参与倡议是最重要的突出的例子。此外，这些举措还因涉嫌促进绿色清洗或没有推动果断的气候行动而受到批评。 4 鉴于这些举措的重要性和市场重要性，我们使用 ClimateBert CTI 的廉价谈话指数作为指标来调查它们与企业气候行动披露的关联。

近年来，为促进企业气候行动和决策有用信息的披露，出现了许多行业主导或自愿的市场倡议。其中，“基于科学的目标倡议”（SBTi）所倡导的气候行动、“气候相关财务披露特别工作组”（TCFD）的披露建议以及 “气候行动 100+”（CA100+）参与倡议都是最突出的例子。然而，研究表明，特别是SBTi和TCFD举措在改善气候信息披露方面效果有限，并且不会在最需要的地方引发雄心勃勃的气候行动（$\color{blue}{Bingler\ et\ al.,\ 2022FRL}$；$\color{blue}{Bolton\ and\ Kacperczyk,\ 2021cNBER}$）4。鉴于这些倡议的重要存在和市场重要性，作者以$ClimateBert_{CTI}$的空谈指数为指标，调查了其与企业气候行动披露的关联。

4:For critiques on these initiatives, see for example https://www.climatechangenews.com/2022/02/06/science-based-targets-initiative-accused-providing-platform-greenwashing/, https://bridgingandcommercial.co.uk/article/18207/majority-of-uk-firms-see-tcfd-climate-reporting-as-box-ticking-exercise, and https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a33eb47c-a3fb-4222-a769-ebbe4ddde31f. These concerns have already been discussed for the United Nations’ Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), where academic literature (Gibson et al., 2021, Kim and Yoon, 2022, Bauckloh et al., 2021) finds that the PRI does not meet expectations and does not deliver on its promise.

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